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Saving and Endogenous Grovth: A Survey of Theory and Policy

Abstract

The paper surveys and extends recent results on"the effect of changes in
government fiscal and financial policy and in private savings behavior on
economic growth. Private saving behavior is represented by an OLG model. The
supply side of the model permits endogenous growth through aggregate constant
returns to an augmentable input. Private sector behavior is parameterized
with the time preference rate, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
the birth rate, the death rate and the rate at which labor productivity
declines with age. Fiscal instruments include public consumption spending,
the capital income tax rate, deficit financing and balanced-budget
intergeneration al redistribution (an unfunded social security retirement
scheme).
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(I) Introduction

The study of saving behavior has been a central theme of economics since
the days the subject was known as political economy.

This paper aims to

provide a broad-ranging survey of some of the key issues involving the
determinants of the savings rate and the consequences of different kinds of
savings behavior for economic growth.

It brings together and in minor ways

extends results on overlapping generations (0LG) models and endogenous growth
by Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg [1990a,b, 1991], Saint-Paul [1990], Jones
and Manuelli [1990] and Buiter and Kletzer [1991a,b,c].
Saving behavior, abstaining from current consumption, is one of two key
determinants of economic growth.

The other is the efficiency with which the

resources that are saved are invested, that is, channeled into and allocated
among alternative productive uses. This paper will focus exclusively on the
first issue: how much is saved.

The view that saving .is a key determinant of

long-run potential output growth has not been popular since the early 60's
when the empirical study of aggregate production functions purported to show
that the output elasticity of physical capital was low and that technological
change, which was modeled as exogenous, accounted for a large fraction of the
growth of output per worker (Solow [1957]).
A broader view of what constitutes investment, which encompasses R&D,
additions to the stock of knowledge and human capital accumulation (formal and
informal education, on the job training etc.) has necessitated a broader view
of what constitutes saving. Technical change has been endogenized and our
view of the role of saving in the growth process has been correspondingly
broadened. Vhere the old "exogenous growth" literature attributed to saving
behavior at most a permanent effect on the level of per capita income but only
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a transitory effect on the rate of growth of per capita income, the new
"endogenous growth" lit~rature implies that differences in saving behaviour
will have permanent effects both on growth rates and levels of per capita

income.

(See e.g. Romer [1986, 1990], Lucas [1988], Barro [1990], Barro and

Sala-i-Martin [1990], Sala-i-Martin [1991a,b], Grossman and Helpman [1991] and
Helpman [1991]).
The issue can be put very simply.

The aggregate production function for

the economy we are considering is linear in the aggregate capital stock, that
is Y = aK, where Y is real output, K is the aggregate capital stock and a is
some positive constant.

Consider a closed economy without government.

Capital depreciation is ignored.
output.

Lets denote the ratio of private saving to

It follows that the growth rate of capital (and thus of output) is
K

y

given by K = y

= sa.

With constant returns to a factor (or to factors) that can be

accumulated, anything that raises the savings rates or the productivity of
the accumulated factor(s) a will raise the growth rate of the economy.
paper focuses on the determinants of s.

This

The determinants of a are not

considered.
Differences in savings behaviour may be due to a variety of factors.

One

important set of determinants of saving are private preferences, that is
private attitudes towards intertemporal choice.

In standard neo-classical

theory this is captured in such features of the preference ordering as the
psychological or subjective pure rate of time preference, the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, attitudes towards intergenerational gifts and
bequests and the parameters governing the precautionary demand for saving. 1 A
second set of influences on private sector saving behaviour is the nature of
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private sector anticipations concerning future asset returns and after-tax
non-asset income.· These can range all the way from Muth-rational expectations
to myopic, adaptive or other behavioral hypotheses.
Demographic features constitute a third set of influences on private
saving behaviour.

Vhile the current age composition of the population must to

a large extent be viewed as predetermined, that is, not subject to current
public or private choice, its evolution over time will be influenced by
private choices impinging on birth and death rates.

Government policy too can

influence the evolution of the demographic structure, both directly and by
influencing private choices co-determining birth and death rates.
Finally, even for a given demographic structure, government policy can
influence both the private and the total national (private plus public) saving
rate.

This can be done though policies involving redistribution among

heterogeneous consumers (such as deficit financing and unfunded social
security retirement schemes) and through policies that alter the opportunity
cost of saving.
Endogenous growth theory has amplified the effects of changes in
parameters and exogenous variables.2 Since the impact of policy on long-run
growth has slipped a derivative, special attention will be given in this paper
to the way in which economic policy influences saving.

Among the policy

instruments that will be considered are unfunded social security retirement
schemes, deficit finance, the taxation of wage and non-wage income, interest
taxes and subsidies and public consumption spending.

The relationship between

private and public saving (the financial crowding out issue) has of course
long been a central theme of macroeconomics.
The linearity of the aggregate production function in the aggregate
capital stock represents a considerable simplification the global dynamics of
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capital, output and consumption, when compared to the neoclassical exogenous
growth model with consta.nt returns to capital and the non-augmentable factor
labor jointly.

As will become clear in Section VI, by expressing stocks and

flows as ratios to the capital stock, the dynamic analysis involves one fewer
state variable than the corresponding exogenous growth model.

The model is

therefore a useful didactic tool for a first introduction to growth theory.
Limitations of space restrict the scope of this paper to the link between
saving and long-term growth.

This means in particular that I omit

consideration of the cyclical relationship between private and public saving
behavior and private investment, and of the role of fiscal and financial
stabilization policy.

The separation of the saving decision from the

investment decision in modern capitalist economies with, to a first
approximation, households doing the saving (in the form of accumulation of
financial assets) and firms making the capital accumulation and R &D
decisions, creates the possibility of intertemporal coordination failure,
where the ex-post balancing of saving and investment occurs at a socially
inefficient level.

Asymmetric information between borrowers (investing firms)

and lenders (saving households) may result in incompleteness of the set of
contingent forward markets.

Financial intermediaries may emerge that help

overcome or at least mitigate the failure of market prices to convey all
information necessary for efficient saving and investment decisions.

If this

is not privately rational, welfare-improving fiscal or regulatory
interventions may exist.

The beginnings of rigorous analytical underpinnings

to a formal theory of financial market failure along these lines can be found
in the work of Bernanke and Gertler [1987].
The plan of the paper is as follows.
consumption side of the model.

Section II develops the private

Section III restates the necessary and
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sufficient conditions for absence of debt neutrality in the OLG model under
consideration.

Section IV discusses the impact effect on saving of the social

security retirement scheme first formalized by Saint-Paul [1990].

Section V

introduces a very simple model of the supply side that is consistent with
endogenous growth in an OLG setting.

The structure of property rights,

together with the technology, permits new generations to participate in the
market game with endowments whose value increases in line with the growth
rate.a
In Section VI I investigate the effects of changes in the parameters
characterizing tastes (the time preference rate, the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution), demography (the birth rate, the age-dependent
labor power depreciation rate and the death rate) and fiscal policy (public
debt, labor income taxes, the parameters describing the unfunded social
security retirement scheme, the tax rates on capital rental income and on
interest income and exhaustive public consumption spending).

Section VII

concludes.

(II) The deaand side of the

■odel.

(a) Private consU11ption.
Private consumption is given by the overlapping generations model of
Blanchard [1985] and Veil [1990] as synthesized in Buiter [1988].

At each

instant ta consumer born at times~ t solves the following optimum problem:

(1)

1
max Et/: 1: c(s,v) -1{exp[-p(v-t)]}dv
1
{c(s,v)}
c(s,v) > 0 for alls and for all v > s.

P, 1 > 0

4
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Subject to the budget identity

(2)

}i a(s,t)

_ (r(t)

+

A)a(s,t)

+

i(s,t) - r(s,t) - c(s,t)

and the solvency constraint
f

{3)

lim a(s,f)exp{-/ [r(u)
f➔rn

+

t

A]du} = 0.

Ve also have

{4a)

i(s,t)

=

w(s,t)J(s,t)

(4b)

w(s,t)

=

w(t)

{4c)

j(s,t) = j(t,t)e-r(t-s)

for alls

s ~ t

Et is the expectation operator, conditional on information at time t.

1

is the elasticity of instantaneous marginal utility or the reciprocal of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution: a larger value of 1 indicates a
stronger desire to smooth consumption over time.

pis the subjective rate of

time preference, c(s,v) is consumption at time v by someone born at times, a
denotes financial wealth, i is the individual's labor income, w is the wage
rate or the rental rate of human capital, J is the amount of labor power {in
efficiency units) applied by the individual,

r

is the amount of lump-sum taxes

net of transfers on labor income and r is the real interest rate.

Each

consumer faces a time and age independent instantaneous probability of death,
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A~ 0.

Everyone currently alive will therefore, regardless of age, have the

same life expectancy 1/A. This is of course very poor demography and it also
means that the theory cannot expect to capture most of the life cycle effects
on saving.

Human capital is homogeneous and its rental rate is the same for

everyone currently alive {4b).

Equation {4c) says that the human capital of a

person born in periods equals that of a person born in period t times a
factor e-~(t-s).

This can be interpreted as aging leading to the erosion, at

the constant exponential rate~, of the raw labor endowment of an individual.
The term Aa on the right-hand side of equation (2) is due to the presence
of efficient annuities markets.

Consumers contract with annuities companies

to receive a rate of return~ on their financial wealth at each instant.
they die, their entire financial wealth goes to the annuity company.
annuities industry is competitive, risk neutral and has free entry.

Vhen

The
A is both

the instantaneous probability of death and the fraction of each (large) age
cohort {and therefore of the total population) that dies at each instant.

The

zero expected profit condition implies that~= A.

I define human capital h{s,t) to be the present discounted value at time
t (using the "risk-of-death-corrected" individual discount rater+ A) of
expected future before-tax labor income of someone born at times< t.
ro

{5a)

li{s,t)

= J x(s,v)(exp{-/
t

V

[r(u)+A]du})dv

t

Similarly I define O(s,t) as the present discounted value, at time t, of
the life-time taxes expected to be paid by a household born in periods, that
is
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V

-/(r(u)+,\)du
CD
dv
O(s,t) = f r(s,v)e t

(5b)

. t

Under rational expectations s, the solution to the consumer's problem is

(6a)

c(s,t) = n(t)[a(s,t) + h(s,t) - U(s,t)]

(6b)

n(t)

1

CD

=

V

[f {exp -[(1::!)/ r(u)du + (v-t)(J
I

t

t

+

1

1

-p)]}dv]'Y

Note that this implies that:
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(6c)

(b) Aggregation

Vithout loss of generality I set 91(0), population at time zero, equal to
1, that is 91(0)

=

1.

In addition to the constant death rate J

~

0 there is a

constant birth rate P ~ 0. The rate of growth of population n is therefore
constant and given by n

=

P - A, that is 91(t)

=

e(P-J)t

=

ent.

Note that,

when P > O, total population at time t can be written as the sum of all
survivors of previous generations, that is 91(t)

=

pe-Atf

t

ePsds.

Raw labor

-w

power is assumed to decline with age at a constant proportional rate~.

Let

l(s,t) be the raw labor power supplied at time t by the surviving members of
generations and n(s,t) the number of members of generations surviving at
time t.

It follows that l(s,t)

=

n(s,t)e-~(t-s)

=

pe[(P+~)s-(A+~)t] .

Summing over all past generations yields the aggregate supply of raw labor
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power, L(t), given in equation (7).

(7)

Corresponding to any individual flow or stock variable v(s,t) I define
t
the corresponding population aggregate V(t) to be V(t) = Pe-At! v(s,t)ePsds
-a:,

if p > O and V(t)

= v(s,t)e-At

if P = O.

Special mention deserves 0(t), the

present discounted value, at time t, of the expected life-time taxes to be
paid by all those currently alive, which is given by

(8)

0(t)

-Ht-

R

= Pe J O(s,t)ePsds
-a:,

Lump-sum taxes (net of transfers) are assumed to vary with age in the
following manner.

Lump-sum taxes paid by a member of generations~ t,

r(s,t), are the sum of an age-independent component, t 0 and an age-dependent
t (t-s)
component t 1e 2
which grows exponentially with age, as shown in equation
(9). In order to obtain, for the study of long-run effects of tax changes in
Section (IV), dynamic systems with an interesting steady state, it is also
assumed that individual taxes include a "scale component" E(t), which for the
moment I only require to be positive.

(9)

r(s,t)

Provided P > t 2 , a necessary condition for total tax receipts to be
bounded, total tax revenue at each instant tis given by:
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Since there are neither voluntary nor involuntary
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bequests in our

model, people are born without financial assets or liabilities, that is
a(s,s)

(11)

=

It follows that aggregate consumption is given by:

0.

C(t)

=

n(t) [A(t)

+

H(t) - 0(t)]

where n is defined in equation (6b) and

.

(12)

A(t)

(13)

H(t)

(14)

=

r(t)A(t)

=

(r(t)

+

p + ~)H(t) - X(t)

=

(r(t)

+

P)0(t) - T(t) - n(t)

.

.

0(t)

+

X(t) - T(t) - C(t)

where
(15)

Integrating (13) forward, the aggregate human capital of those currently
alive can be written as in equation (16a) and the aggregate tax burden faced
by those currently alive as in equation (16b)
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(16a)

(16b)

H(t)

0(t)

=

=

V
-/(r(u)+,8+T)du
CD
dv
/ X(v)e t
t
V
-/(r(u)+,B)du
CD
dv
/ [T (V) + n (V) ] e t
t

The term Tis present in the discount rate for human capital income in
equation (16a) but not in the discount rate for future taxes in equation (16b)
because the depreciation of raw labor power with age, at a constant rate

T,

only affects the before-tax component of labor income and not the tax bill.
The term non the right-hand side of equations (14) and (16b) is present if
and only if there are age-dependent lump-sum taxes, that is if both t 1 and t 2
are non-zero and if the birth rate is positive. O(t) represents the
contribution by those born at time t to the rate of change in the
age-dependent component of the tax burden.
Ignoring n for the moment, we see that H(t), the aggregate human capital
of those currently alive, is the present discounted value of future after-tax
wage income, where the discount rate is the real interest rate augmented by
the birth rate .8 and the rate of labor power depreciation

T.

The presence of

the birth rate signals that the future expected labor income of "new entrants"
{those born after time t) is not owned by anyone currently alive.

An

operative intergenerational gift and bequest motive would cause the discount
premium associated with .8 to disappear.

So of cause would a zero birth rate

or a different structure of labor property rights, such as a society in which
all labor is performed by people subject to hereditary slavery
(see Buiter [1989]).

In the Blanchard-Weil OLG model an "owner-occupier"
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system of labor property rights, taxation of labor income and a positive birth
rate are necessary and sufficient for absence of debt neutrality.

Uncertain

lifetimes (A> 0) do not belong to the set of necessary and sufficient
conditions.
Equations (11) to (15) plus the definition of q in (6b) imply that the
rate of change of aggregate consumption can be written as

(17)

(c) The government.

At each instant t the government spends an amount G(t)

~

0 on public

consumptions, raises tax revenues T(t) and finances any excess of current
outlays over current revenues by issuing fixed real market value, variable
interest rate bonds.

Monetary financing is not considered.

The stock of

these bonds is denoted B(t). The government budget identity is given in (18).
Together with its solvency constraint, given in (19) it implies the
governments intertemporal budget constraint given in (20): the current debt
should equal the present discounted value of future primary (non-interest)
surpluses.

(18)

.
B(t)

= r(t)B(t)

+

G(t) - T(t)

f,

(19)

lim B(f)exp[-/ r(u)du] = 0.

£-100

t
OJ

(20)

V

B(t) = / [T(v) - G(v)]{exp[-/ r(u)du]}dv
t
t
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(d) Equilibrium.

Markets clear at each instant.
capital, K,

In this closed economy real reproducible

and government debt are the only non-human stores of value.

Financial market equilibrium therefore requires that (21) holds for all t.

A(t)

(21)

=

K(t) + B(t)

Capital accumulation is governed by

.

K=Y-R-C-G

(22)

where Y is gross real output and

o > 0 the instantaneous rate of depreciation

of capital.

(III) Debt neutrality.

In this section I briefly review the necessary and sufficient condition
for debt neutrality in our consumption model. None of the results of this
Section depend on the model of production.
I proceed as follows.

Into the aggregate consumption function given in

equation (11) we substitute for A using equation (21), for H using equation
(16a) and fore using equation (16b).
w

V

/ G(v)exp{-/ [r(u)+P]du} and rearrange.
t

Then add and subtract the term
This yields equation (23). When we

t

replace this last step by the elimination of B(t) from the aggregate private
consumption function using the public sector intertemporal budget constraint

14

(20), equation (24) results.

For easy reference, the definition of n is

reproduced as well.
V

(23)

C(t)

=

V

-/(r(u)+P+x)du
-/(r(u)+P)du
- G(v)e t
]dv]
n(t) [K(t) + {CD[X(v)e t

Z

V

CD
t t
CD
-/ (r(q)+A-t )dq
-/(r(u)+P)du
2
2
dz]e t
dv]
+ n(t) [B(t)-/[T(v)-G(v)+Penvc,/_ t )/ f(z)e v
t

2

V

V

(24)

C(t)

=

V

-/(r(u)+P+x)du
-/ r(u)du
n(t)[K(t) + {CD[X(v)e t
- G(v)e t
]dv
+ /{T(v) [eP(v-t) - 1]
t
V

t t
CD
-/ (r(q)+A-t )dq
-/(r(u)+P)du ]
2 dz}e t
dv
- Penv[7/_2t ]/ t:(z)e v
2

n(t)

= [/

t

CD

1

V

V

1

1

{exp -[(1::.!.)/ r(u)du + (v-t)(A + -p)]}dv]I

t

1

From the government's intertemporal budget constraint given in equation
(20) it is clear that the second term on the right-hand-side of equation (23)
is identically equal to zero if and only if the birth rate P equals zero.
When that is the case, government debt and the intertemporal distribution of
lump-sum taxes do not influence private consumption behaviour. Ve are
effectively (despite the possibility of a positive death rate) in a
representative agent model. Debt neutrality breaks down if the intertemporal
redistribution of lump-sum taxes associated with government borrowing
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redistributes life-time resources between agents that are heterogeneous with
respect to their consumption behaviour (see Buiter [1990]).
are no new agents coming into the system.

Vhen P = 0 there

All those currently alive have the

same life expectancy and the same marginal propensities to spend out of
comprehensive wealth~The same conclusion is reached when I set P = 0 in equation (24).

The

third expression inside the big brackets on the right-hand-side of equation
(24) disappears in that case.

All that matters for aggregate consumption is

the government's exhaustive spending program.

(IV) An Unfunded Social Security

Retire■ent Sche■e.

Following Saint-Paul [1990], I can analyze the consequences of the
introduction (or an increase in the scale of) an unfunded social security
retirement scheme by introducing balanced-budget redistribution from the young
to the old.

Again, the results do not depend on the model of production.

In this Section, I evaluate the impact effect on aggregate consumption of
changes in the parameters characterizing the social security retirement
scheme, holding constant the initial stocks of capital, K, and government
debt, B, and the expected future paths of interest rates, r, and wage income,
X, and exhaustive public spending, G.9 If aggregate consumption changes as a
result of these parameter changes, there are likely to be consequences for the
future behaviour of such endogenous variables as output, the capital stock,
the wage rate and the interest rate.

In Section VI a simple dynamic general

equilibrium growth model will be used to evaluate the dynamic responses of
these and other endogenous variables.
Saint-Paul [1990] models an increase in the scale of an unfunded social
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security retirement scheme as follows. 10 Vithout loss of generality consider
the case where the init\al value of t1 is positive. Consider an increase in
t1 , the amount of tax paid by a newborn. This increase in taxes paid while
young is accompanied by a change in the growth rate of the tax burden with
age, t2 , which is just sufficient to keep total tax receipts at each point in
time constant. From equation (10) this implies that

(25)

Since P > t 2 , an increase in t 1 , with t 1 positive, requires a reduction in t 2
in order for total tax receipts to remain constant: pay more when young and
less when old.
Note that, with the tax rule under consideration,
V

-J(r(u)+A)du
i(s,t)

t

= J r(s,v)e
(I)

dv , the present discounted value, at time t, of

t

the life-time taxes expected to be paid by a household born in periods is
given by
V

-J(r(u)+A)du
i(s,t)

t

(I)

= t0Jf(v)e
t

Therefore, 8(t)

=Pe

-At t

J i(s,t)ePsds, the present discounted value, at time

-(I)

t, of the expected life-time taxes to be paid by all those currently alive, is
given by
V

V

-f(r(u)+A-t2)du
-J(r(u)+A)du
t 1/.Ja
t
ent~of E(v)e t
dv + (p _ t )J E(v)e
dv]
(I)

(26)

e(t)

(I)

=

t

2 t
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It is easily checked that the effect on 8(t) of an increase in t 1 with t 2
reduced so as to keep T(t) constant is given by:
V

(27)

-J(r(u)+A-t2)du
nt CD
t
= -{3e J (v - t)f(v)e
dv < 0

d8(t)

err:-l

t

dT(t)=O

Balanced-budget redistribution from the young to the old therefore
reduces the presented discounted value of the total future truces to be paid by
those currently alive.

Since all those currently alive have the same marginal

propensities to spend out of comprehensive wealth, the result will be an
increase in aggregate private consumption and a reduction in private saving.
Since we are considering a balanced-budget operation, total private plus
public saving also falls.

(V) The supply side of the

■odel.

To motivate the specification of the production side of the model it is
necessary to remember that I am trying to construct the simplest possible
competitive endogenous growth model with Yaari-Blanchard-Veil OLG
demographics.

I therefore want the aggregate production function to be linear

in the aggregate capital stock,

while the structure of property rights has to

be such that in equilibrium new generations are born with endowments whose
value rises at the endogenous rate of growth. Ve cannot achieve both
objectives if the individual firm's production function were to be specified
as linear in that firm's own capital stock, with no other essential scarce
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inputs such as labor, that are typically assumed to be owned by new-born
households, even in the absence of private intergenerational gifts.

Ve would

be hard pushed to think of a plausible property rights structure that would
give the new generations a claim to some share of the capital stock in
existence when they are born.

One way to ensure that the newborn can join

fully in the endogenous growth game is to allow workers to appropriate the
quasi-rents created by an economy-production externality.

This is the

approach adopted here.
The representative firm, i, produces a homogeneous output yi with a
production function, given in equation (28), which is positive for positive
inputs, increasing, constant returns to scale in its two inputs, physical
capital, Ki and labor input in efficiency units Ji, strictly concave and at
least twice continuously differentiable.

(28)

y.1

= F(K.,
1

J.)
1

I define ki

=Ki/Ji.

= J.f(K./J.)
= J.f(k.)
1
1
1
1
1

J.,
which measures the i th firm labor input in efficiency units, is the
1
product of Li, the quantity of raw labor power hired by firm i and
quality index of labor, which is the same for all firms. 11

E,

the

I shall assume

that, in the spirit of Sheshinski [1967], quality or efficiency is measured by
the economy-wide capital-labor ratio. 12 The interpretation of "capital" should
therefore probably rather broader than plant, equipment and structures.
Extreme simplicity is the main virtue of this model.

(29a)

J. = EL.

(29b)

E

1

1

=

K/L
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N

N

where K

and L = ~ L.

=. ~1K.1

. 1 1
l=

l=

Firms hire workers and rent capital to maximize profits.
takers and also take

f

They are price

to be independent of their own choices of K.1 and L1..

This creates a positive externality in the private accumulation of capital and
a negative externality in the use of labor. 13 Let w be the wage of raw labor
power (say the rental rate of one hour of labor time, where the hours per
worker can vary with age, as determined by the parameter~).

It follows that

The rental of a unit of efficiency labor, w, is of course given by:

- k.f'(k.)
w = w/f = f(k.)
1
1
1
The private profit maximizing demand for capital is given by

- 8
r = f' (k.)
1

Here 6

~

0 is the constant exponential rate of depreciation of capital.

Letting Y =
Y=

N

~ F(K.
1
. ·1
l=

N
~

y., I aggregate across all firms to get

. 1 1
l=

K
, rL 1-). Using the fact that all firms are identical and the
J.,

linear homogeneity of F(., .), the aggregate production function can be
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written as

Y = F(K, K)
Defining

(30) .

a=

= Kf(1)

f(1) > 0, I can write aggregate output as linear in K

Y = aK

Note that the social return to an additional unit of physical capital is
given by a - b

=

f(1) - b, while the private gross marginal product of

capital, which I shall denote a', is given by a'= f'(1) < f(1)

= a.

Private

capital accumulation does not allow for the non-appropriable benefit of
raising the average quality of the labor force.

In this model, the interest

rate and the real wage are fixed by technology and constant:

= f'(1)

- b

= a'

(31)

r

(32)

w = f(1) - f'(1)

- b

=a -

a'

Since the economy is not viable if the net social marginal product of
capital is negative, I assume:

The net private marginal product of capital can either be positive or
negative.
Note that this specification of the production technology would avoid a
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problem, signaled by Jones and Manuelli [1990] that can arise in
finite-lifetime (Samuelson-Diamond) OLG models of endogenous growth.

They

consider a model where the one-sector technology of production in principle
permits endogenous growth.

The consumers' side of the model is the standard

two-period Samuelson-Diamond OLG model without intergenerational gifts and
bequests, in which the young have a positive endowment of labor that is
constant from generation to generation.

Growth peters out in the long run

because the young generation does not have enough resources to purchase an
ever increasing capital stock from the old.
rule out this problem.

Our equations (28) and (29a,b)

The value of the labor endowment per worker, which is

constant in physical units, is augmented one-for-one with the aggregate
physical capital stock, which increases the efficiency of this physical
quantity of labor.
In the Yaari-Blanchard-Veil OLG model of this paper, there is of course
no life-cycle pattern of saving.

Since everyone, regardless of age, has the

same remaining expected lifetime (which may be infinite), the young have the
same marginal propensity to consume out of wealth,

n,

as the old.

and Manuelli problem does show up in another form, h~wever.

The Jones

Alogoskoufis and

van der Ploeg [1990a,b, 1991] used the same aggregate production function,
given in equation (30) as is used in this paper. The individual firm's
production function however, was given by yi = F(Ki, K/N) , i
F linear homogeneous.

=

1, ... ,N, with

There is an externality in the use of capital, because

each individual firm takes the average capital stock (per firm) K/N as
There is no labor input in the
independent of its ow choice of K..
1
production function.
In the description of their model Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg do not
include labor among the productive inputs or endow new generations at birth
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with labor or with any other claims on resources that would give them a stake

.

in the economy, let alone a stake that grows in value at the rate required to
sustain endogenous growth.

In terms of our model of consumption, h(t,t) = O,

and the newborn cannot get into the game. 14 The model also cannot explain how
those already in the game, who own the capital stock, ever got to own any
capital if they started off at birth without any claim on valuable scarce
resources.15 The problem is one of property rights assignment.

Fortunately,

they then proceed as if workers are born endowed with claim on an equal per
capita share of the marginal product of K/N.

This makes their model

effectively equivalent to the one of this paper.
In Buiter and Kletzer [1991a,b] which develops an endogenous growth model
with a Samuelson-Diamond (3-period) OLG demographic structure, the endowment
of the young grows at a rate sufficient so sustain endogenous growth, but
through a different mechanism.

Equations (28) and (29a) are kept, but
~

e

equation (29b) is replaced by something like ~f = {(j_i,
. , . )
f

{ 1 > 0.

f

may be interpreted as the economy-wide stock of useful knowledge; e. are the
J
th
resources (education and training) spent by the j household to augment its
own knowledge and skills.

There again is an externality because each

household ignores the effect of its own education and training on

E,

and thus

on the productivity of other households currently alive or yet to be born (E
does not die when the households that contributed to it die: human capital may
die but the stock of useful knowledge survives unscathed).
goods structure permits endogenous growth. 16

The impossibility of dynamic inefficiency.

From equation (22) we get

This two capital
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.

I/K = a - 6 - C/K - G/K

The growth rate of capital is, since C and Gare non-negative, never
higher than the net social marginal product of capital. This economy, with
its linear technology is therefore never dynamically inefficient. 17 Clearly, a
necessary condition for dynamic inefficiency is that the marginal product of
capital be able to fall below the average product.

Vith output linear in the

capital stock, the social marginal and average products of capital are always
equal to each other and constant. 1s

(VI) Saving and long-run growth.

To simplify the exposition, I shall start the analysis in this Section
with the case of age-independent labor power(~= 0) and age-independent taxes

(t1 = 0 or t 2 = 0). Since capital is the natural "scale variable" of this
economy, I shall consider the behavior over time of the growth rate of

capital, of consumption per unit of capital, C/K
unit of capital, B/K

=b.

= c,

and of public debt per

In order for the system to have steady states, I

will treat government consumption per unit of capital, G/K
taxes per unit of capital, T/K
Let

.
'#.% =K/K.

= 7,

=g,

and lump-sum

as the policy instruments .

From equations (17), (18), (21), (22), (30), (31) and

(32), I obtain the following system of equations, familiar from the work of
Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg [1990a,b]:

(33)

'#.% =

a - 0-

g-

C
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(35)

.

b

=

(a' - a+ g)b

+

Note that, since r is constant,

g- r

~

cb

+

is also constant and given by

(36)

I first consider the case where there is no public debt outstanding,
b

=

O, and the budget is balanced continuously through endogenous variations

in the ratio of lump-sum, age-independent taxes to aggregate capital, r. 19
In this case the dynamics of the system is captured by a single quadratic
differential equation in consumption per capita:

(37)

~

=

-~P

+

1
[1- (a' - 8 - p)

+

n - a+ 8

+

g]c

+

c2

.

Figure 1a shows the parabola representing equation (37) in c-c space, referred
to henceforth as the consumption parabola.

There are two stationary

*
equilibria, one for a positive value of c (shown as c1) and one for a negative
*
value (shown as c2).

Only the positive stationary equilibrium is economically meaningful.
*
Note that c is a non-predetermined state variable and that c1 is an unstable
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equilibrium.

Figure 1b graphs the inverse (with slope -1) linear relationship

'1x

and c given in equation (33), referred to henceforth as the capital

between

The minimum of the parabola need not be for positive value of c.

growth line.

Even if the economy is viable (a> 6), the intercept of the line

'#x=

a - 6 -

g - c in Figure 1b, could be negative for sufficiently large
Even when the intercept is positive, the common steady state

value of g.

growth rate of capital, output and consumption can be negative, as shown in
Figure 1b.

A balanced-budget increase in public cons1111ption.

Vhen there is a balanced-budget increase in public consumption, the
capital growth line shifts down vertically by the increase in g (as shown in
Figure 2a), and the consumption parabola shift up and to the left, reducing
the long-run equilibrium value of c.

As shown in Figure 2b, the effect on the

long-run growth rate of capital is unambiguously negative: while the long-run
consumption/capital ratio falls, it falls by less than the increase in the
government consumption/capital ratio.
*

o > dc 1

ag

=

-0.5{1

+

y

[T 2 +

} > -1
417,8] 0 ' 5

1
Y = ,- (a'-6-p)+n-a+6+g

This result, that an increase in public consumption crowds out capital
formation as well as private consumption is different from the result that
would have been obtained in the representative agent version of the model (the
special case where ,8

=

0).

Vhen ,8

=

O, government consumption only crowds out
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private consumption in the long run, leaving capital formation unchanged.
More generally, in the r~presentative agent model, any unanticipated,
immediate permanent increase in public consumption causes an equal reduction
in private consumption, in the short run as well as in the long run.
from equation (37) that when P = O,

.

the c equation is homogeneous.

Note
There is

a trivial stationary solution (c *2= 0) and a sensible stationary solution
4
*
4
*
(c1 = -[1 (a'-8-p)-A-a+o+g] and 1.x= 1 (a'- 8 - p) - A). Note that since
the interest rate (which equals the private rate of return to capital) and the
time preference rate both are exogenous and constant, they will not in general
From equation (6c) the rate of growth of individual
consumption will, in and out of steady state be equal to 1-1 (a'- 8 - p).

be equal to each other.

Returning to the case with a positive birth rate, the transition to the
new stationary equilibrium will be instantaneous if the increase in g is
With K predetermined at the moment of the fiscal
shock, the decline inc from c1*O to c*1
1 must be due to a fall in the level of
consumption. Afterwards the rate of growth of aggregate consumption equals

unanticipated and permanent.

the new lower rate of growth of capital.

If public spending is not

intrinsically valued, this increase in public spending constitutes an
unambiguous worsening of welfare.
If the announcement date of the increase in public consumption (t 0)
precedes the implementation date (t 1), the behaviour over time of c and f .x
is as shown in Figure 3a,b.
with a capital growth rate

Starting from a stationary equilibrium at c;o

r;~

the level of consumption jumps to a lower

level (a point such as n1 in Figure 3a) immediately (at t 0) when the
unexpected news about the future higher taxes associated with the future
higher public spending arrives.

Note that this initial decline in consumption
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is smaller than when the policy change is immediate (t 0 = t 1). Between the
announcement date (t 0) and the implementation date (t 1) the level of
consumption per unit of capital moves continuously from n1 to n2 . At the
implementation date t 1 , the level of c is at its new steady state value and
its rate of change jumps from the negative value at n2 to zero. The rate of
growth of the capital increases at the announcement date from 1~to the
value of 1xat n1 in Figure 3a. Between the announcement date and the
implementation date 1xcontinuous to rise. At t 1 the system has reached
point n2 and the rate of growth of the capital stock declines to its new,
lower long run equilibrium value.

An increase in the

ti■e

preference rate.

For reasons of space I henceforth only consider unanticipated
announcements of immediate permanent shocks.

As shown in Figure 4a,b an

increase in the pure rate of time preference leaves the capital growth line in
Figure 4b unaffected while the consumption parabola in Figure 4a shifts down
everywhere.

With the unanticipated permanent shock, the transition to the new

higher steady state level of consumption per unit of capital and lower steady
state growth rate of capital is immediate.

Greater impatience results in more

consumption in the short run but less growth and consumption in the long run.20

A higher birth rate.

As shown in Figure 5a,b an increase in p leaves the capital growth line
unchanged and shifts the consumption parabola up.2 1 The new long-run
equilibrium has a higher growth rate and a lower consumption-capital ratio. 22
When the increase in the birth rate is unexpected, immediate and permanent,
the transition to the new steady state is immediate.23
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.

! reduction in life expectancy .
Figure 4a,b can also serve (qualitatively) to illustrate the effects of
an increase in A, the instantaneous probability of death.

As expected,

shorter horizons boost the long-run consumption/capital ratio and reduce
long-run growth.2 4 The capital growth line does not shift and the consumption
parabola shifts down.2 5 If the reduction in life expectancy is unanticipated,
immediate and permanent, the transition to the new steady state will be
immediate.
Note that when the birth rate and the death rate increase by equal
amounts, keeping the rate of growth of population constant, the model predicts
a net reduction in the saving rate.

Long-run consumption per unit of capital

increases and the growth rate of the capital stock decreases:
ac1*

ac1*

or+ or=

(n + P){[1

-1

(a'-o-p)+n-a+o+g]

2

+ 4nP}

--0 5

•

An increase in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.

It is obvious that the capital growth line is unaffected by the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/ 1 . From equations (36) and (37) we
obtain that:

.
Bel

~ c given

=

(P

+

c)(a' - o + p)

The consumption parabola will shift up (down) if the private return to capital
a' - 6 =

r exceeds (is below) the subjective time preference rate p.

From
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equation (6c) we know that if r > p, individual consumption is low but rising.
If lrss importance is attached to the smoothing of consumption over time (1/7
increases), we should expect to move to an equilibrium with a lower level but
a higher growth rate of consumption.2 6 This is the case where the consumption
parabola shifts up, as in Figure 5a.

If the change is unanticipated and

permanent, the transition to the new steady state with its lower value of c
and its higher value of 1xwill be instantaneous.

Capital rental taxes.
A tax (Kon the rental income of capital (with the revenue returned as

equal per capita lump-sum transfers to all those currently alive) changes the
arbitrage condition equating the returns on bonds to the returns from owning
capital to

An increase in the capital income tax rate (K is therefore equivalent in our
model to a reduction in

a'

with

a

unchanged.

The tax leaves the before-tax

private marginal product of capital (and the social marginal product of
capital) unchanged, and reduces the after-tax private rate of return to
capital one-for-one.

It is clear that an increase in (K does not shift the

capital growth line.

Its effect on the consumption parabola is given by:

.

a,acKcI given =

(1 -

l1 )P - le
1

In the frequently analyzed logarithmic utility case

(1

= 1)

the

consumption parabola shifts down, as in Figure 4a,b, raising long-run c and
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'#x

reducing long-run

For this result to be reversed and the consumption

1
parabola to shift up, it must be true that 1- < p ~ c
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An increase in the capital rental tax rate (K does two things.

First, it

reduces the after-tax return to capital corresponding to any given pre-tax
rate of return.

Because of our linear technology the before-tax rate of

return is fixed, so the after-tax rate of return and the rate of interest
decline one-for-one with the increase in (K.

Second, it transforms capital

income into lump-sum transfer payments to all those currently alive.

By doing

so it redistributes, at time t, some income from those born before time t, who
own the capital and pay the capital income tax, to those born at time t, who
own only their human capital plus the present discounted value of the net
future lump-sum transfers they receive.
case of our model (P

=

In the representative agent special

0), the redistribution effect is absent.

an (income-compensated) reduction in the rate of interest.

There is just

The substitution

effect of the lower rate of interest will shift down the consumption parabola,
thus raising the long-run value of c and reducing the growth rate of capital.
'When Pis positive, the newborn receive a bonus from the older generations
when (K increases.
tax.

They do not own any capital on which to pay capital income

If the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1/7 is small (less than

1), the (negative) income effect on current consumption of the lower interest
rate they face as a result of the increase in (K will_ dominate the
substitution effect and they will save more.

It is conceivable that this

effect dominates the increase in consumption by the older generations.

This

is essentially the point made by Engel and Kletzer [1990] in the context of an
open economy OLG model with tariff revenues redistributed as a residence-based
wealth subsidy.
Considering taxes on interest income (r does not add to the analysis, as
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the marginal private and social products of capital are unaffected.

The

before-tax interest rate would rise to offset the interest tax and leave the
after-tax rate of interest unchanged.
rate of interest.

The newborn too will face an unchanged

Since they have the same marginal propensity to spend out

of comprehensive wealth as the older generations, there will be no effect on
aggregate consumption.

An unfunded social security retirement scheme.

To study the long-run growth effects of the unfunded social security
retirement scheme discussed in Section IV, I set~= g = 0 and consider
balanced budget schemes with B = 0.

I define:

w = fl/K
From equations (15), (29b) and (31)

(39)

w(t)

(3t 1 t 2

= JJ _

t

/
2 t

wffitv -( a'-8+(3-t 2 ) (v-t)
t e

dv

Note that the scale variable in the tax function ,e , is given bye= K/L.
The equations of motion and the capital growth equation for this case are
given in equations (40) through (42).

(42)

'# X

= a -

8- c
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Note that the forward-looking integral in equation (39) exists only if
r

+

/3 - t 2 exceeds the growth rate of capital 'j..%' in steady state. Also,

w

cannot change sign for given t 1 and t 2 . In what follows I only consider small
changes in t 1 and t 2 that do not change their signs. For reasons of space, I
shall look only at the case where both t 1 and t 2 are positive, which implies
that w is always positive .

.

Thew= 0 locus is given by

(43)

c

C ~

= a' - a

This is the truncated (for c
in Figure 6a through 6d.

~

0

0 and w > 0) rectangular hyperbola shown

Its vertical asymptote is the vertical axis (w = 0)

and its horizontal asymptote is a' - a+ /3 - t2 . There is no solution to this
equation for positive values of both c and w unless a' - a+ f3 - t > O. I
2
assume this to be the case in Figures 6a through 6d and 7.
The c = 0 locus is the "parabola on its side", shown in Figures 6a
through 6d and in Figure 7, given by

(44)

c

2

+

[r-1 (a' -

o-

p)

+

n - a+

o]c

+

~(w - /3)

=

O.

On this locus, when c = O, w = p. To obtain real solutions for c, we
require w 5 P + [r-1 (a' - o - p) + n - a+ o] 2/4n.
1 -1( a' - 0 - p) + n - a+ o].
l.7hen W = p + [ 1-1 (a'-o-p) + n-a+o] 2/4~ , C = - ~[7
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-1

2

t1t2

(a' - 8 - p) + n - a+ 8] /4~ ~ (p-t )(a'-a+p-t ) , no
2
2
stationary solution with positive values for c and b exists. This case is

Unless fi + [1

shown in Figure 6d.

In the rest of this subsection I assume this condition is

satisfied, so one or two stationary solutions with positive values for both w
and c exist.

c

From equation (44) the two solutions for care given by

1
= ½[-[1- (a'-8-p)+n-a+8]

1
1
2
: {[1- (a'-8-p)+n-a+8] -4n(w-fi))}~

The long run effect on c and w of an increase in t1 with t 2 adjusting
according to equation (25) so as to maintain total tax receipts unchanged,
yields:

(45a)

de
_ A -1 [fi - t 2 /Ja ]
of
-Ll
{
+;;-~
1 dT=O
1

(45b)

1

(45c)

+ n - a +

8]

2

- 4n(w -

fi)]}

2

At a stationary equilibrium (c * , w*), the non-linear equations of motion.
can be approximated by the following system of linear differential equations
with constant coefficients:

34

(46)

Since both state variables, c and w, are non-predetermined, a unique
stationary equilibrium which is unstable would guarantee a unique continuously
convergent solution.

Such a configuration is shown in Figure 6a.

Note that A

is the determinant of the coefficient matrix on the right-hand side of
equation (46).

If the configuration of the stationary equilibrium is locally

completely unstable, then A will be positive.

Vhen the stationary equilibrium

is on the downward-sloping segment of the c = 0 locus, (as at n in Figures 6a)
is is always completely unstable.
upward-sloping part of the c
provided that the c

=

=

Vhen the stationary equilibrium is on the

0 locus, it can still be completely unstable,

0 locus has a steeper slope that thew= 0 locus.

Equilibria such as n in Figure 6b and n in Figure 6c fall in this category.
1
A stationary equilibrium such as n in Figure 6c, where the positive slope of
2
the c

=

0 locus is less than the slope of thew= 0 locus corresponds to a

negative value of A.

The equilibrium is a saddlepoint, and there is a

(one--0imensional) continuum of initial conditions from which the system will
converge to that stationary equilibrium.
Vhen A is positive, one sees from equation (45a) that the new stationary
equilibrium value of c increases when t is increased and t reduced in a
1
2
balanced-budget manner (when there is an increase in the size of the unfunded
social security retirement scheme).

.

Graphically, thew locus shifts up when

t 1 is increased and t reduced with total taxes receipts constant.
2

Figure 7
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shows how, when the equilibrium is a completely unstable one on the
down-ward-sloping segment of the c = 0 locus, w decreases across steady states
as c increases.

\Then the completely unstable equilibrium lies on the

O locus (as at n in Figure 6b or n in
1
Figure 6c) the increase in the scale of the unfunded social security

upward-sloping segment of the c

=

retirement scheme increases w along with c.2s
\Then the stationary equilibrium is unique and completely unstable, the
transition to the new steady state following an unexpected, immediate and
permanent increase in the scale of the unfunded social security retirement
scheme will be instantaneous.
Finally, from the capital growth equation we again note that, as always
except for the case where exhaustive public spending is raised, the decline in
the growth rate of capital equals the increase inc.

Deficit financing of a tax cut

The last case I consider will be the debt financing of a temporary cut in
lump-sum taxes.

For simplicity I again set~= t 1 = tt = 0. The public
spending/capital ratio g is also set equal to zero. There now are two state

variables, c and b, whose behavior is governed by equations (47) and (48).

-~fi(l

(47)

c =

(48)

b = (a' -

+

b)

a+

+

[1-1(a'

- 8 - p) + n - a+

o]c

+

c

2

c)b - r

Note that, with r exogenous, the possibility of unstable public debt
dynamics is built into the model.

Since a' < a, a larger value of the level

of the public debt/capital ratio, b, will be associated with a larger negative

36

rate of change of the public debt/capital ratio, b, for small values of c
(that is for large values of
negative values of

'#..,J,

'#..JJ·

For large values of c (for low or

however, larger values of bare associated with

.

larger positive values of b.

Clearly, with

T

exogenous, instability is in the

air. 29
For illustrative purposes I consider a tax function that always causes
the public-debt/capital ratio to converge to a unique stationary equilibrium
value.

It is given in equation (49).

(49)

T =To+

cb

In addition to the exogenous component TO (assumed constant), there is an
endogenous component which exactly offsets the term cb in equation (48).

Vith

this tax function, the debt dynamics are now governed by:

(50)

b = (a' - a)b -

To

Since the constant private marginal product of capital a' is always less
than the private (and public) average product of capital a, b always converges
monotonically to its long-run equilibrium value b* given by

The c

=

0 locus is unaffected by the nature of the fiscal rule.

given by the non-negative solutions to

It is
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In

uJ,

c space, this is again a parabola "on its side".

only interesting case is where b
0.
=

~

-1.

Since K ~ O, b

Economically the

= -1 implies B = -K

The total value of all productive resources in this economy is K.

~

'When B

-K, the government (as net lender to the private sector) effectively owns

the entire stock of productive resources in the economy.

The government

clearly cannot lend more than that in this closed system, as there are no
remaining private resources against which these loans can be secured.
~

With b

-1, there is one positive stationary solution given by
1

(52)

c =

½[-[1-1(a'-8-p)+n-a+8] + {[1-1(a'-8-p)+n-a+8] 2+4~P(1+b)}~

In b-c space, the c

=0

locus, shown in Figure 8, starts at b

=

-1 and c

For b > -1, c increases monotonically with b, but at a decreasing rate.

= 0.
In

the limit as b goes to infinity, the slope of the locus goes to zero.
The b

=

0 locus is vertical in b-c space.

Since we only consider values

of b greater than -1, it follows from equation (51) that we require

If this restriction is satisfied, there will be a unique stationary
equilibrium, fl, in Figure 8.

Locally, the system near fl is a saddlepoint.

Since there is one predetermined state variable band one non-predetermined
state variable c, this means that there will only be one continuously
convergent solution.

For a given value of r0 , SS is the unique convergent
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saddlepath.
b = 0 curve.

The "most divergent" solution trajectory UU coincides with the
All soluti~n trajectories other than SS will have an asymptote

at UU (even though this may take them into the infeasible c < 0 region).
Figure 9a,b shows the response of c, band

1.x,

the growth rate of the

capital stock, to an unanticipated permanent reduction in r 0 . Since
government exhaustive spending is unchanged, all this amounts to, (as can be
seen from the government intertemporal budget constraint given in equation
(20)), is a postponement of taxes that are constant in present discounted
value (using the real interest rater as the discount rate).

Because the

private sector effectively discounts at r + P (since new tax payers will be
born who will share part of the burden of the postponed taxes), this
intertemporal redistribution of taxation is also an intergenerational
redistribution of taxation that leaves those currently alive better off.
Starting from an initial stationary equilibrium at n in Figure 9b, the
level of consumption immediately increases to n01 , the point on S'S', the
convergent saddlepath through the new long-run equilibrium fl', that lies
vertically above n in Figure 9b.

In Figure 7a this corresponds to a

discontinuous reduction in the growth rate of capital and output, from n to
n01 . After the initial jump-increase in consumption, the consumption/capital
ratio and the debt/capital ratio increase continuously along the convergent
saddlepath S'S' towards their new long-run equilibrium values at n,.

The

capital growth rate declines continuously from n01 in Figure 9a ton,. This
confirms the results obtained by Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg [1990a,b].
As demonstrated in Saint-Paul [1990], alternative consumption
trajectories supported by different intertemporal redistributions of taxation
cannot be Pareto-ranked.

Government borrowing, with debt serviced through
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lump-sum taxation (or balanced-budget redistribution schemes using lump-sum
taxes and transfers such as the unfunded social security retirement scheme
analyzed earlier) merely redistributes intergenerationally.

Postponing

taxation by borrowing favors current over future generations, but there are no
efficiency issues involved.

This may seem surprising, since we are in a

second-best world: the private return on capital a' - 6 is below the social
return

a -

6.

This inefficiency, however, is not affected in any way by the

intergenerational redistribution effected by the government through borrowing
or through unfunded social security retirement schemes.

(VII) Conclusion.
If the production technology of the economy (broadly defined) permits
endogenous growth, one obvious lesson is that fiscal policy changes and
changes in the parameters that govern private behavior can have long-run
growth rate effects as well as long-run level effects.

The welfare implications

of this "magnification" of the effects of exogenous shocks on the growth rate
are not as straightforward as the positive implications.

As was pointed out

by Saint-Paul [1990], balanced-budget redistribution towards the old and
deficit financing of tax cuts (even age-independent tax cuts) will reduce the
long-run growth rates of capital, output and consumption.

As long as the

taxes involved are lump-sum, however, the trajectory with the lower growth
rate will not be Pareto-dominated by that with the higher growth rate.

There

is intergenerational redistribution, from the future generations towards the
present ones, but no free lunches are being served or taken away.
Against that, of course, it should be pointed out that the magnitude of
the intergenerational redistribution associated with a given policy change is
enhanced in endogenous growth models.

Reasonable social welfare functions may
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suggest policies more favorable to a higher savings rate, if the returns to

.

saving and accumulation are bounded away from zero sufficiently strongly to
permit endogenous growth.

In any case, even if the efficiency consequences of

policy are not magnified, the distributional consequences will be.

Policy is

therefore likely to matter more in endogenous growth models than in exogenous
growth models.
A second lesson emerges as a by-product of one of the less attractive

features of the one-sector endogenous growth model used in this paper: the
constancy of the real interest rate.

In this model, as in the "Unpleasant

Monetarist Arithmetic" model of Sargent and Vallace [1984], there is financial
crowding out: government borrowing reduces total national saving and, in a
closed economy, displaces private capital formation.
the scale of the social security retirement scheme.

So does an increase in
Still, there is no

movement of interest rates in response to the policy changes (or changes in
private behavior) that cause the financial crowding out.

In the world of our

model, those who view financial crowding out as mediated necessarily through
higher real interest rates would fail to identify the effect of government
financing on private capital formation.
A third lesson is mainly for educators: the analysis of the response of
economic growth to a variety of private or government shocks is considerably
more straightforward when the economy is represented by the simplest
endogenous growth model than when it is represented by the simplest exogenous
growth model.
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Footnotes
1In the standard expected utility framework with a time-separable utility
function, the precautionary saving motive is governed by the third derivative
of the instantaneous utility function.
2Note, however, that the existence of permanent effects on the growth
rates of capital, output and consumption does not automatically imply the
existence of large efficiency effects. In Section VI we shall see examples
where public policy permanently affects the growth rate, but the alternative
growth paths cannot be Pareto-ranked. There will be large welfare effects,
but these take the form of intergenerational redistributions of welfare.
3In the finite-horizon OLG model of Samuelson and Diamond, this
specification of technology and property rights means that the problem flagged
by Jones and Manuelli [1990], that the value of the endowment of the young may
not keep up with the value of the capital owned by the old (which the young
are supposed to purchase from the old in equilibrium), will not occur. A
richer specification of technolgy and property rights that achieves the same
purpose was used by Buiter and Kletzer [1991a,b]. In the age-independent time
horizon OLG model of the current paper, the life-cycle issues emphasized by
Jones and Manuelli are absent. The problem of ensuring that the new
generations are endowed with scarce resources whose value can grow at an
endogenously determined rate remains, however.
41 = 1 corresponds to the case of log utility.
5The only uncertainty modeled explicitly is the uncertainty concerning the
time of one's demise. Consumers born at times are assumed to know that the
probability of surviving till time t ~sis e-A(t-s). This term augments the
subjective discount factor, which becomes e-(p+A)(v-t) for someone
discounting, at time t, the utility of consuming at time v ~ t. The model can
then be treated as a perfect foresight model.
6Note that n = n{n - [('-1)r +A+ !p]}.
In steady state this gives a
1
1
1
non-zero solution n = (1~ )r +A+ ~p. In the logarithmic utility case
(, = 1) this reduces ton= p + A, both in and out of steady state.
7The absence of involuntary or unintended bequests is due to the
assumption of perfect annuities markets.
8Government capital formation is not considered.
Public consumption
either is intrinsically useless or, if useful, enters the private utility
function in an additively separable manner.
9Ve shall also consider the effects of changes in G and B.
10 Saint-Paul considers a "twisting" of the wage-age profile, that is a
larger value of~ combined with a higher value of the starting wage at age
zero. Vhat we do in this paper is equivalent in terms of its impact effect on
the savings rate.
11Note that c is also the scale factor applied to the tax function given in
equation (9). This permits a well-behaved steady-state to exist in the model
but has no other significance.
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[1967] actually suggested using the economy-wide stock of
physical capital as the index of labor efficiency, not the economy-wide
capital-labor ratio. Using this alternative specification would of course
generate a model with unbounded static increasing returns to scale, something
we do not wish to contemplate even at this level of abstraction. Romer [1986]
and Lucas [1988] developed models with increasing static returns to scale in
which the quality of labor is augmented not by the accumulation of physical
capital but rather by accumulation of knowledge and skills.
13The private marginal product of capital is a' - 8 and the social marginal
product of capital a - 8. The private marginal product of labor is a - a',
its social marginal product is zero.
12Sheshinski

the government tranfers resources to them, by making O(t,t)
positive.
150ne way to endow the newborn with capital at birth is for the government
to make a capital transfer to them or for the government to commit itself
credibly to a future sequence of current transfer payments.
16An attractive feature of this model is that it does not imply a constant
real interest rate.
17 Note, however, that it is not Pareto efficient because of the capital
stock (or labor) externality.
1BVe owe this point to Olivier Blanchard.
It is spelled out formally in
Saint-Paul [1990].
19 Note that while the ratio of aggregate taxes on labor income to the
aggregate capital stock varies endogenously, each individual private agent
takes the amount he pays in taxes on labor income to be independent of his
individual accumulation of capital. The tax therefore remains a lump-sum tax
on labor income and does not become a capital income tax.
14Unless

*

20:pcl = 0 _51-l{l _
uu

[1-1 (a'-8-p)

} >0
+ n - a+ 8 + g - 2P]
{[1-l(a'-8-p) + n - a+ 8 + g]2 + 4nP}0.5

.
= -n + c . From the
.
c given
aggregate consumption function we know that C = n(A + H - 0) . Since A= K
in our case we have c = n(l +HK 8 ). If human capital net of the present
discounted value of taxes on human capital is non-negative, then c > n. Ve
assume this condition to hold.
*
l
r -1 (
ac
2~1 = 0.5{-1 +21a'-8-p) + n - a+ 8 + g2+ 2~ 0 5}
{[1 (a'-8-p) + n - a+ 8 + g] + 4~P} ·
21From equation (37) we obtain that;

1
(n - c){[1- (a'-8-p) + n capital is positive.

a+

8 + g] 2 + 4~P}-0. 5 < 0 provided human
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23An increase in the rate at which labor power decays with age, ~, has
exactly the same effect on c as an increase in the birth rate.
*
2/c1 _ O 5{1

1JI -

·

-r,-11 (a'-8-p) + n -

a + 8 + g - 2P]
}
2
0
5
+ {[,- (a'-8-p) + n - a+ 8 + g] + 4nP} ·

.
25From equation {37) it follows that~,

.
c given

=-(P

+

c) < 0.

*

ocl
-1
2
-0 5
26ofl = (c + P)(a' - 8 - p){[,
(a'-8-p) + n - a+ 8 + g] + 4nP} · .

27Let the consumption/output ratio be 0.8 and the annual capital-output
ratio 3.3. This means that c = 0.24. With P = 0.01, the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution would have to be less than 0.04 for the consumption
parabola to shift up instead of down as the capital income tax rate increases.
Those who pretend to know about these things, argue that this is too low a
number. Halving or doubling the birth rate doesn't change that conclusion.
28Note that when A is negative, as at n2 in Figure Sd, the increase in the
scale of the social security retirement scheme reduces c and w.
29Even with r exogenous, the model is not necessarily badly behaved
everywhere. There can e.g. be a stationary equilibrium with a relatively
small value of c and a negative value of b that constitutes, locally, a

.

saddlepoint. The b = 0 locus in c-b space is a rectangular hyperbola with
equation c = a - a'+ b-1r. Note that c ~ 0 is equivalent to ~ a' - a< 0.
Negative values of bare therefore certainly not ruled out. In the following
Figures A and B some possible configurations are shown. Fugure A is for a
positive value of r. There always is a high c stationary equilibrium, with a
positive value of b , n1 , that is completely unstable. There may also be a
low c equilibrium with a negative value of b, n , that is a saddlepoint. This
2
will occur if 0 : - a > -1. A higher value of r will raise the value of c

i

.

(lower the value of K/K) at the high c equilibrium (n 1) by shifting up the

.

positive segment of the b

.

=

0 schedule.

It will lower the value of c (raise

K/K) at the the low c equilibrium (n 2 ) by shifting down the negative segment

.

of the b = 0 schedule. In Figure B, r is negative. As shown in the Figure,
there may be no stationary equilibrium with a positive value of c. If there
are two equilibria (not shown), they will both have the same sign for b. All
this is sufficiently bizarre not to devote more time to it.
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